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Understanding how aesthetic preferences are shared among individuals, and its
developmental time course, is a fundamental question in aesthetics. It has been shown
that semantic associations, in response to representational artworks, overlap more
strongly among individuals than those generated by abstract artworks and that the
emotional valence of the associations also overlaps more for representational artworks.
This valence response may be a key driver in aesthetic appreciation. The current study
tested predictions derived from the semantic association account in a developmental
context. Twenty 4-, 6-, 8- and 10-year-old children (n = 80) were shown 20 artworks
(10 representational, 10 abstract) and were asked to rate each artwork and to explain
their decision. Cross-observer agreement in aesthetic preferences increased with age
from 4–8 years for both abstract and representational art. However, after age 6 the
level of shared appreciation for representational and abstract artworks diverged, with
significantly higher levels of agreement for representational than abstract artworks at
age 8 and 10. The most common justifications for representational artworks involved
subject matter, while for abstract artworks formal artistic properties and color were the
most commonly used justifications. Representational artwork also showed a significantly
higher proportion of associations and emotional responses than abstract artworks. In line
with predictions from developmental cognitive neuroscience, references to the artist as
an agent increased between ages 4 and 6 and again between ages 6 and 8, following the
development of Theory of Mind. The findings support the view that increased experience
with representational content during the life span reduces inter-individual variation in
aesthetic appreciation and increases shared preferences. In addition, brain and cognitive
development appear to impact on art appreciation at milestone ages.
Keywords: empirical aesthetics, convergence, semantic association, neurocognitive development, meta-
cognition, emotion
INTRODUCTION
Evaluating an object’s beauty is a central property of human behavior with aesthetic
preferences developing in early infancy (Krentz and Earl, 2013), and influencing behavior
in a wide range of circumstances. Understanding how aesthetic judgements develop
and what determines aesthetic appreciation is an important challenge for psychologists
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(Gardner et al., 1975; Lin and Thomas, 2002; Leder et al., 2004;
Göksun et al., 2014; for a review, see Lindell and Mueller, 2011).
A primary focus of this research is an examination, from a
developmental perspective, of the hypothesis that a key driver in
aesthetic appreciation is the associative thoughts people have in
response to the subject matter of an artwork (Vessel and Rubin,
2010).
Drawing on behavioral data, several influential theories of
aesthetics have been developed (e.g., Martindale, 1984; Leder
et al., 2004; Reber et al., 2004) and considerable progress has
been made to identify the visual properties of artworks and
the attributes of the viewer that influence aesthetic appreciation
(Martindale, 1984; Leder et al., 2004; Reber et al., 2004; Palmer
et al., 2013). A key component of all theories of aesthetics
is the idea that greater understanding in the viewer reliably
enhances aesthetic appreciation (Martindale, 1984; Parsons,
1987; Winston and Cupchik, 1992; Zeki, 1999; Leder et al., 2004;
Reber et al., 2004; but see Belke et al., 2015). This is supported
by the finding that increased understanding provided by titles
reliably enhances the appreciation of photographs (Millis, 2001)
and artworks (Russell, 2003; Leder et al., 2006). Greater art
expertise also increases the liking of all genres of artwork
(Leder et al., 2012) and abstract art in particular (Gordon, 1952;
Winston and Cupchik, 1992; Hekkert and van Wieringen, 1996)
presumably because art expertise facilitates the understanding
of the formal properties of art when representational content
is absent (Winston and Cupchik, 1992; Lindell and Mueller,
2011). As Landau et al. (2006) suggest, a lack of understanding
in response to abstract art may be the primary reason why naïve
adult viewers consistently prefer representational to abstract art
(Gordon, 1952; Heinrichs and Cupchik, 1985; Winston and
Cupchik, 1992; Mastandrea et al., 2011; see also Leder et al., 2006,
2012).
Although understanding is important to aesthetic
appreciation it takes time to develop (Gardner et al., 1975;
Parsons, 1987; Belke et al., 2010) and for naïve viewers of art, and
children, research suggests that aesthetic appreciation is often
quite rudimentary, being governed by a few primary attributes
of the artwork, such as subject matter and color (Gordon, 1952;
Machotka, 1966; Parsons, 1987; Winston and Cupchik, 1992).
In children aesthetic appreciation also depends on their level
of neurocognitive development, which will limit the aspects
of the artwork and intentions of the artist that they are able
to process and understand (see Callaghan and Rochat, 2003).
For example, aesthetic appreciation in infants who are too
young (<1 year) to understand the representational nature of
images is strongly influenced by the color and the visual pattern
of the artwork, as measured by their allocation of attention
(Cacchione et al., 2011). Once children understand the dual
representational nature of pictures (i.e., that a picture is both
an object itself and a symbol of something else; DeLoache
and Burns, 1994) subject matter becomes more important in
aesthetic appreciation (Gordon, 1952; Machotka, 1966). This
is mirrored in the development of children’s own drawing
ability, which progresses from non-representational scribbling
towards the production of more realistic images (e.g., Golomb,
1992, 1994). It is likely, therefore, that older children will be
more influenced by the representational content of the artwork
(Taunton, 1980) and with the increasing ability to understand
the perspectives of others mental states (Theory of Mind,
Premack and Woodruff, 1978; Armitage and Allen, 2015) an
understanding of the artists’ intentions may also influence
aesthetic appreciation.
Leder et al. (2004) proposed that basic forms of aesthetic
understanding can involve associative processes, with a viewer
generating meaningful information that relates to them because
the artwork triggers an association with something they have
experienced, remembered, or of which they are aware. The
associative ideas of Leder et al. (2004) anticipate the work of
Vessel and Rubin (2010) and see also Biederman and Vessel
(2006) who proposed that in naïve viewers shared thoughts in
response to the content of an artwork have a powerful role
in aesthetic appreciation. They reached this conclusion from
their finding that the aesthetic appreciation of realistic images
(photographs) is more consistent across observers than for
abstract images. Vessel and Rubin (2010) propose that, because
people have similar experiences in their lives (e.g., when on
a beach, walking a dog, or in a car park), when an image
represents such a scene it causes similar thoughts in people
which influence their liking of the image. Therefore, they explain
the greater consistency in representational images as being a
product of individuals sharing more thoughts and evaluations
for meaningful/realistic images (e.g., a scenic view) than they do
for abstract images, causing preferences for the abstract images
to be more variable across individuals. In support of Vessel
and Rubin’s theory, Schepman et al. (2015b) found, when they
measured the valence of participants’ associations in response
to abstract and representational artworks, that the valence of
the associations correlated with a participant’s liking of an
artwork, and both liking and association valence were more
consistent across observers for representational than abstract
art. Moreover, associations in response to representational art
showed greater semantic similarity across participants than
associations in response to abstract art (Schepman et al.,
2015a).
Vessel and Rubin’s theory suggests that associative thoughts
are a major influence in aesthetic evaluations in naïve viewers
and determine the consistency of aesthetic preferences across
individuals. It can also be expected that over time children
will be repeatedly exposed to items in the world that reliably
elicit positive experiences (e.g., certain animals, scenes), so that
when those items are re-presented as an image they should elicit
a positive association. Research suggests that children develop
the capacity to understand graphic images as representational
symbols towards the end of the third year of life (e.g., Callaghan,
1999), causing pictures to become commonplace in adult-child
interactions both at home and in educational settings (e.g.,
through story book reading; Szechter and Liben, 2004; Danko-
McGhee and Slutsky, 2011). If Vessel and Rubin are correct,
the association children have developed with the subject matter
of a representational picture should influence their appreciation
of the picture, and as children will have been exposed to
particular items more often as they get older, the strength of
the association (and similarity in preference), should also grow
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stronger with age for representational artworks but not abstract
artworks.
Vessel and Rubin’s theory and Schepman et al.’s results
indicate an important role for associations in aesthetic
appreciation, but very little research has directly examined
associations in the development of aesthetic preferences. There
is some evidence from unstructured interviews that associations
might be important for aesthetic appreciation in young children,
with the associations frequently being idiosyncratic but driven
by the content (e.g., ‘‘giraffe’s back . . . a dog’s face’’, for
Picasso’s ‘‘Girl Before a Mirror’’; Housen, 2002), but the majority
of research has emphasized other factors. For example, in
Parsons (1987) influential work he interviewed children on
their appreciation of artworks and concluded that there were
five successive stages of aesthetic understanding, starting from
a basic and rudimentary understanding to a more complex
and detailed appreciation. In stage 1 color and subject matter
were of primary importance in determining a young child’s
liking of an artwork (see also Lin and Thomas, 2002) and
children in later stages were concerned with how accurately the
picture represented the world (stage 2), the expressiveness and
emotions elicited by the artwork (stage 3), and the medium,
style, formal properties, organization and artist’s intentions
(stage 4). However, associations were not explicitly listed by
Parsons as having a particularly powerful influence on aesthetic
appreciation in any of the five stages. Despite this, Parsons
observed that some content resulted in a high level of agreement
in aesthetic evaluation, particularly for children in stage 1,
with nearly all the children liking a particular artwork because
it featured a dog. Similarly DeSantis and Housen (1996) and
Danko-McGhee and Slutsky (2011) found that children liked
certain artworks because of the content (e.g., fish, dogs, etc.),
which they describe as a process of ‘‘simple association’’, and
Freeman and Sanger (1995) found that the majority of children
thought a picture would be bad if it depicted something that was
ugly. These findings support the view that aesthetic preferences
for representational art can be remarkably consistent if the
thoughts and emotions elicited by the artwork’s content are
relatively similar across individuals.
Parson’s work was developed further by Lin and Thomas
(2002) who examined aesthetic preferences in children (4–5
years, 7–9 years, 12–14 years), and adults (non-art undergraduate
students, art and design students), for artworks from five genres
(abstract, fine, contemporary, humorous, and cartoon). For
each genre participants were presented with five artworks and
were asked to select the artwork they most liked, and then
describe what the picture was about and why they liked it. Lin
and Thomas then classified the participant’s statements into
nine categories (e.g., subject matter, color, form, association
etc.) to examine how frequently different types of justification
were mentioned by participants when explaining their choice.
They concluded from their findings that the development of
aesthetic understanding did not follow the strict sequence of
stages that Parsons originally proposed, but could branch in
different directions and that understanding and preferences
changed with age. Only art students showed different reactions
for the different genres of art, showing that naïve viewers
have relatively similar responses irrespective of the genre and
that exposure to, and knowledge of art, is crucial to the
nature of the aesthetic experience and the depth of processing
achieved (Winston and Cupchik, 1992; Augustin and Leder,
2006; Leder, 2013). In agreement with other studies subject
matter and color were frequently mentioned and were of
primary importance for aesthetic appreciation in all groups
(Machotka, 1966; Rump and Southgate, 1967; Rosentiel et al.,
1978; Bell and Bell, 1979), though color was very important
for the youngest group and declined somewhat with increased
age. Finally, despite having an ‘‘association’’ coding category,
few participants referred to associations when explaining their
preferences.
It is possible, however, that the infrequent reference to
associations was due to Lin and Thomas’ procedure of requiring
participants to select a particular artwork and then explain their
justification. If a few attributes determine liking inmost instances
(e.g., subject matter, color, artistic properties) then most of the
artworks will have been chosen on the basis of these attributes
(and will also have been the participant’s justification for their
choice). Therefore, asking participants to select the artwork
might have limited the complexity and range of participant’s
justifications for their aesthetic preferences, and prevented the
detection of less salient influences on choice. We aimed to
overcome this limitation by asking participants to explain their
level of liking for an artwork without the artwork being pre-
selected by the participant.
It is also apparent from the literature that the extent to which
responses to artworks are viewed as associations varies markedly
but is crucial to whether findings are interpreted as supporting
Vessel and Rubin’s theory. It is possible that Lin and Thomas
(2002) did not find a large role for associations because they
used a specific definition, of ‘‘being reminded of material’’. If a
broader concept of associations is adopted to refer to interpretive
thoughts (with a valence) generated by the content of an artwork
then it appears that those thoughts may determine liking in naïve
viewers (Parsons, 1987; Freeman and Sanger, 1995; DeSantis and
Housen, 1996). It is this concept of associations that we subscribe
to and which we believe might cause the earlier development
of shared preferences for representational art than abstract art.
It also corresponds to Vessel and Rubin’s (2010) description
of semantic associations, which are an interpretation of the
image’s content, and are distinct from other low-level perceptual
associations that can be elicited by the physical features of an
the image. An example of a semantic association would be
thoughts of a ‘‘holiday’’ elicited by the depiction of a beach, or
‘‘shopping/work’’ from an image of a car park, while a perceptual
association might be thoughts of ‘‘hard’’ or ‘‘cold’’ in response
to the particular lines or colors of an image. It is important to
note that a semantic association is not a simple reiteration of the
subject matter but has a level of interpretation of the image, and
which Vessel and Rubin suggest are elicited much more readily
by representational images than abstract images.
The development of aesthetic preferences towards different
styles of artwork was also examined very recently by
Schabmann et al. (2015) in a study whose publication occurred
when our own empirical work was already complete. They asked
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children (age 4–6 and 9–11) to rate different styles of artworks
on four dimensions, namely liking, valence, understanding,
arousal and categorized the children’s verbal responses to
questions about their evaluation of the artwork. They found
that emotion was an important determinant of liking at all ages,
but particularly for the younger children, with older children’s
evaluations becoming increasingly cognitively based.
Our study aimed to test, in primary school children (aged
4, 6, 8 and 10) predictions derived from Vessel and Rubin’s
(2010) theory of shared aesthetic preferences, whilst also building
on the work of Lin and Thomas (2002). We gathered liking
data using a quantitative liking scale, in addition to recording
children’s verbal justifications of their aesthetic evaluations.
This represented a balanced approach, in which all children
could communicate their evaluations relatively independently of
language ability, as well as providing their own reasoning for
these evaluations which would not be revealed through a forced
choice task.
Of focal interest to the association theory, our first hypothesis
was that shared liking would emerge more strongly at older
ages for representational as opposed to abstract artworks,
strengthening the view that thoughts triggered by the subject
matter are an important driver in aesthetic appreciation. Based
on the findings of previous research (Trautner, 2008), our
second hypothesis was that a preference for representational
art would emerge at older ages, potentially because older
children are increasingly influenced by the representational
content of the artworks in the same way that adults are
(e.g., Landau et al., 2006). In relation to the justifications
provided, it was expected that a greater range and complexity
of reasons would emerge with advancing age, due to a
more sophisticated understanding of art underpinned by
neurocognitive development, which, in turn, may drive aesthetic
development (hypothesis 3).
We treated the justification data on an exploratory basis, and
thus without formal hypotheses. We explored whether subject
matter, associations, understanding and interpretation, and
mood and emotions played a stronger role in the justifications
for representational than abstract artwork. Based on prior work,
we also explored whether color and subject matter would be
mentioned particularly frequently in the justifications for the
aesthetic ratings (e.g., Gardner et al., 1975; Parsons, 1987; Lin
and Thomas, 2002). We also aimed to explore whether color
and other formal artistic properties would be more prominent in
justifications for abstract than for representational art. We made
a number of further observations which we linked to aesthetic
and general neurocognitive development. These are reported in
the ‘‘Results’’ Section.
MATERIALS AND METHODS
Participants
Eighty children from a National Curriculum Primary school in
Cheshire participated in the study. The school’s achievement
levels were approximately average (1% below the national mean)
for the year in which testing took place. Ethical approval
was received from the Ethics Committee of the Department
of Psychology, University of Chester, and complied with
British Psychological Society ethical guidelines. The school
head teacher gave provisional consent for the study to take
place and participants were then recruited from classrooms
teaching 4-, 6-, 8- and 10-year-old children via parental
opt-out consent. Of those available to take part in the
study, the class teacher selected 20 children from each age
group. Teachers were instructed not to choose children who
had particular experience or interest in the visual arts. All
children verbally assented to take part and none refused to
participate. The characteristics of the sample were as follows:
4-year-olds (mean age 4.7, SD 3 months; 15 males and
5 females); 6-year-olds (mean age 6.4, SD 4 months; 8 males,
12 females); 8-year-olds (mean age 8.7, SD 3 months; 10 males,
10 females); 10-year-olds (mean age 10.6; SD 4 months;
10 males, 10 females).
Materials
An initial set of 40 artworks (20 representational and 20
abstract) was selected by authors PR, AS and JK, following
image searches on the internet. This initial set was developed
from the set used in Schepman et al. (2015a, Experiment 1),
with the replacement of some abstract artworks, with an aim
of enhancing the variation in responses in the abstract set. The
artworks selected were not famous to reduce the risk that viewers
had already seen the work and had a pre-formed opinion. We
included in our classification of representational artworks those
that depicted real-life entities without gross distortions in shape
or color. Abstract artworks could not contain any recognizable
objects or scenes, but we did include artworks which contained
recognizable shapes.
Undergraduate student raters provided pre-test ratings on a
seven-point scale of the artworks’ attractiveness, colorfulness,
interest, liking, and negativity/positivity (see Schepman et al.,
2015b for fuller details of the procedure, which matches the
current procedure). Based on this pre-test, we selected 20
artworks, 10 representational and 10 abstract (see Appendix 1),
as we felt that would be the maximum that very young children
would be able to work with. This is consistent with the number
of artworks presented to children in previous studies including
Machotka (1966) and Lin and Thomas (2002). In our selection,
we ensured that any differences in ratings in the larger set
of 40 artworks were also present in the selection. We present
the descriptive statistical properties of the selected 20 artworks
(10 per art type) in Table 1, based on ratings by 23 student
raters.
All artworks were reproduced in high quality color print
on white A4 paper and were presented in a booklet. Three
versions of this booklet were prepared with three different
randomized orders of the artworks that were counterbalanced
across participants to prevent any order effects. Alongside
the booklet, participants were presented with a rating sheet.
On the rating sheet pictures of 1, 2, 3, 4, and 5 stars
were shown labeled with the corresponding number. Star
charts are commonly used as part of educational reward
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TABLE 1 | Pre-test rating means and standard deviations given by
undergraduate students to the artworks used in the main study, by art
type, using a 1–7 scale.
Abstract Representational
Mean SD Mean SD
Attractive 3.66 0.74 4.18 1.06
Colorful 4.71 1.42 4.54 1.15
Interest 3.82 0.77 4.31 0.66
Liking 3.85 0.67 4.59 0.83
Negativity/Positivity 3.99 0.83 4.89 1.28
systems (e.g., Kazdin, 2001) and the idea of more stars
representing greater liking would be familiar to participants,
helping to locate their understanding of the task within a
familiar and concrete context. Liking is also ‘‘the dimension
that best captures the aesthetic response’’ (Schabmann et al.,
2015), and the star rating may have ameliorated some
of the difficulties reported by Schabmann et al. (2015)
when testing kindergarten children with a nine point Likert
scale.
Procedure
All participants were tested individually by author JK at a desk in
a quiet room next to their usual classroom.
The study was introduced to each child as follows: ‘‘We see
pictures every day, for example in books and on walls at school
and at home. We may like some pictures more than we like others.
Today I am interested in what pictures you like. There is no right
or wrong answer; I just want you to tell me what you think of
each picture that I show you.’’ Participants were also instructed
that they could ask for a break at any time during the procedure.
Each artwork in the booklet was presented sequentially to the
participants with the following instruction repeated for each of
the 20 artworks ‘‘I would like to know how much you like this
picture. Would you give it 1 star (you don’t like the picture at
all), 2 stars (you think the picture is ok but that are some parts
that you don’t like), 3 stars (the picture is good. You like it),
4 stars (the picture is very good. You like it a lot) or 5 stars?
(The picture is excellent. You love it).’’ Participants were then
instructed to point to the number of stars that they wanted to give
the artwork on the star rating sheet. If necessary the instructions
were repeated.
After indicating their rating for each individual artwork
participants were then asked ‘‘why did you give that picture
1–5 stars?’’ The instruction was repeated as necessary to elicit
a response and any queries raised by the participants were
answered as follows: ‘‘I am interested to know the reasons why
you gave this picture 1–5 stars. There is no right or wrong
answer. I only want to know what you think about the picture.’’
Due to the potentially limited verbal abilities of some of the
children, three additional categories of prompts were used
by JK to support and clarify participant’s responses. Firstly,
for basic responses without any explanation (for e.g., ‘‘I like
it’’) participants were prompted by asking ‘‘why?’’ or ‘‘what?’’
questions to elicit further detail. Secondly, if participants were
explaining a concept but were unable to retrieve the appropriate
word to describe it (or used the incorrect word), then JK provided
the correct word (e.g., ‘‘calf’’). Finally, if participants provided
an explanation with reference to part of a picture but it was
unclear what part they were referring to, JK asked participants
to clarify this.
To keep the time frame of the study manageable for primary
school children each of the 20 artworks was presented to
the participant for a maximum of 5 min. All justifications
were audio recorded and transcribed for analysis. It is possible
that participants may have been able to give more detailed
responses with additional questioning from JK. However this
may have increased the possibility of interviewer bias. Limiting
the questions posed about the artwork also ensured that the
justifications given were the most salient to the participants
within the time allocated to each picture.
RESULTS
Rating Data
Cross-Rater Agreement as a Function of Art Type
and Age Group
In relation to our first hypothesis, that convergence of
ratings across individuals may be greater for representational
than abstract art, derived from Vessel and Rubin (2010)
and building on Schepman et al. (2015b), we report the
convergence of ratings as a function of art type and age
group first. Following the method used in Schepman et al.
(2015b), participants’ star ratings were analyzed for cross-rater
agreement using non-parametric Spearman’s rank correlation
coefficients, in which each participant’s rating for each artwork
was correlated with the ratings given by all other participants.
These correlation matrices were generated separately for each
age group and art type. The sets of correlation coefficients
thus obtained were compared for differences between art
types in each age group, using non-parametric pairwise
comparisons, namely Wilcoxon signed-rank tests, to test
whether cross-rater agreement differed as a function of art
type in the different age groups. Mean correlation coefficients
as a function of age group and art type are shown in
Figure 1.
From these data, it is clear that the children at age 4
showed very low inter-rater agreement for both abstract (mean
rho = 0.04, SD = 0.33) and representational art (mean rho = 0.01,
SD = 0.33), and their agreement did not differ significantly
as a function of art type (Z = −0.88, p = 0.38). At age 6,
the mean correlation coefficients were somewhat higher (mean
rho = 0.14, SD = 0.31 for abstract; mean rho = 0.17, SD = 0.32
for representational art), but they did not differ significantly as
a function of art type Z = −1.11, p = 0.27). The agreement
for representational art was markedly higher at age 8 (mean
rho = 0.26, SD = 0.31) and age 10 (mean rho = 0.32; SD = 0.30),
and the agreement for abstract somewhat higher than in the
younger age groups at age 8 (mean rho = 0.16, SD = 0.33) and
age 10 (mean rho = 0.17, SD = 0.35). Importantly, at ages 8 and
10 there were significant differences in agreement as a function
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FIGURE 1 | Mean correlation coefficients expressing the level of
cross-rater convergence in star ratings, by age group and art type,
with standard error of the means indicated as bars.
of art type, with children agreeing significantly more with their
peers on their ratings of representational artwork than abstract
artwork (at age 8, Z = −2.89, p = 0.004; at age 10, Z = −3.75,
p < 0.001). Thus, based on these data, it seems that a higher level
of convergence for representational artwork than for abstract
artworks can be observed from age 8, and it continues to be
observed at age 10. This supports our first hypothesis.
Not focally related to our hypotheses, but at the request of a
reviewer and of likely help with the interpretation of the overall
pattern, we also report the effects of age on the correlations.
As main effects, the correlations increased significantly with
age for both abstract (Friedman X2(3) = 18.22, p < 0.001) and
representational artworks (Friedman X2(3) = 68.70, p < 0.001).
Further pairwise Wilcoxon tests showed that for abstract art, the
correlations only increased significantly when comparing age 4
to age 6 (Z = −3.198, p = 0.001), but not for the other adjacent
age pairs (Z > −0.5, p > 0.6), while for representational art,
convergence rose between ages 4 and 6 (Z = −4.385, p < 0.001),
6 and 8 (Z = −2.385, p = 0.017), but the rise only approached
significance between ages 8 and 10 (Z =−1.764, p = 0.078).
Ratings by Art Type and Age Group
To test hypothesis 2 and to gain insight into age trends in
overall liking of abstract and representational art, star ratings
were averaged for each child and each art type. One data point
from one participant was missing as it had not been collected,
but this was estimated using the mean of the condition for that
child. Resulting means and standard deviations for each age
group and condition are presented in Table 2. At the request of a
reviewer, we report the inferential statistics against an alpha of
0.05/4 = 0.0125, by way of Bonferroni correction for multiple
comparisons, while reporting the original p-values yielded by
the inferential tests in Table 2. These analyses showed some
TABLE 2 | Means and SDs for ratings given by children in the four age
groups on a scale of 1–5 stars as a function of art type, with Z and p
yielded by a Wilcoxon test for each pairwise comparison in the rightmost
columns.
Abstract Representational
Age group Mean SD Mean SD Z p (α = 0.0125)
4 3.37 0.72 3.26 0.72 −0.24 0.81
6 3.7 0.55 3.26 0.7 −2.48 0.013
8 3.47 0.67 3.49 0.58 −0.2 0.844
10 3.3 0.67 3.76 0.58 −2.2 0.028
Note that the Bonferroni-corrected alpha for this analysis was 0.0125.
preference trends, which appeared to show a stronger liking for
abstract art at age 6, and a stronger liking for representational
art at age 10, but these were not significant against the corrected
alpha. Thus, the data did not provide support for hypothesis 2.
Justifications
Transcription
Two independent raters (authors JL and AL) transcribed
participants’ verbal responses for each artwork. Each rater
transcribed the verbal responses of half of the participants within
each age group. Transcription was verbatim and the raters were
blind to the age of the participants.
Development and Refinement of the Coding Scheme
To classify and quantify participants’ verbal justifications for
their preferences an initial coding scheme was developed by
JK, PR and AS which included 16 of the most prominently
used categories drawn from a review of relevant literature (e.g.,
Machotka, 1966; Parsons, 1987; Lin and Thomas, 2002) as well
as from JK’s direct experience of listening to the participants
responses.
The initial categories were discussed individually with each
coder (authors JL and AL), and a booklet was produced defining
and explaining the categories as well as giving illustrative
examples of potential quotes which could exemplify these.
A sample of ten participants was randomly selected from the data
set and each rater was instructed to individually code this set of
responses using the initial coding scheme.
Following the initial coding, all authors met to discuss
and evaluate the level of agreement within the provisional
sample and to discuss the coders’ understanding and use of
the coding scheme. Following this discussion, to achieve the
most parsimonious scheme, two categories were deleted because
they overlapped with other criteria and thus did not represent a
unique basis for justifications. The final simplified coding scheme
included the 14 categories which are outlined in Table 3. It is to
be particularly noted that we had to demarcate associations from
subject matter in a precise way to ensure coding reliability.
Coding
Authors JL and AL used the 14-item coding scheme to
classify participants’ verbal justifications for their ratings of
the 20 artworks. They initially coded the justifications that
they had previously transcribed as this ensured a high degree
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TABLE 3 | Final 14 coding categories with brief descriptions and a sample quote for each category.
Category Description
Formal artistic properties Any reference to the formal artistic properties of the artwork such as line, composition or style. “I don’t really like how it’s
set out.”
Color Any reference to the colors used in the artwork. This could be simple naming or counting of colors (or any reference to
color as a means to create, form or express in the artwork). “Because I like all the yellow bits over there.”
Artist Any reference to the person who created the artwork either directly or indirectly. This could include reference to the artist
as an intentional creator of the artwork or to the technical skill, ability or proficiency of the artist. “I like how they have
made the water go back and make the shadows of the dog and not just a squiggle.”
Subject matter Any simple reference to, or statement of, the content or subject matter of the artwork including objects, events or activities
that are formally represented. “Because it’s got fish in it. I don’t like fish.”
Associations Any justification where a connection or link is made between the artwork and the participants own personal life, experience
or memories. “Because it reminds me of one of my friends. It actually looks really like her. She giggles a lot and is laughing
all the time.”
Understanding/Interpretation Any reference to comprehending (or lack of comprehension) of the artwork or any aspects of it, or any attempt to try to
interpret the meaning of the artwork or to build an explanatory narrative for it. “I don’t know what it’s supposed to be”.
Mood/Emotion Any reference to feeling, state of mind or prevailing tone of the artwork and its subject matter, or relating to the viewer or
artist. “Because she looks happy.”
Interest Any reference to basic interest in the artwork, or the artwork commanding attention or attracting curiosity. “It looks quite
interesting.”
Function Any suggestion on the practical usage of the artwork. “Well, I would see it on display but not at an art gallery.”
Comparison Any preferences which are justified through comparison (for example, to other artworks in the stimuli set, or to previous
scores given by the participant). “It’s good but it’s not the best of all the drawings.”
History/Culture Any preferences which are explained or justified by relating the artwork or anything in it to culture or history. “That’s like in
the building where the earthquake struck Kefalonia.”
Perceptual fluency Any reference to the ease, difficulty or speed at which the information in the artwork can be processed. “You can see
what it is at a glance.”
Basic liking Any basic reference to liking or disliking the picture without elaboration or reference to any other theme. “Because I like it.”
Other Any preferences given which are not accounted for by the above themes. “I don’t have a reason I just think it’s three.”
of familiarity with the data. They coded for the presence vs.
absence of the categories for each child’s response to each
artwork, but not the number of times that a particular category
arose within each individual justification. Participants’ verbal
justifications could fall within more than one category, and all
categories that were relevant for that individual justification
were documented. The category ‘‘Basic Liking’’ was only used
if no other reasons were given, and the category ‘‘Other’’ was
used only when none of the other categories applied. Following
initial coding of half the data, coders blindly coded the other
half of the sample, and agreement was checked. If the two
coders had a disagreement, they jointly revisited the conflicting
code and reached agreement by discussion. In some instances,
the coding disagreements were simple entry errors, and these
were repaired. Analysis of all 1600 justifications showed that
in 92.9% of the justifications, the raters agreed on all 14
codes chosen, while in 7.1% of justifications, they needed to
discuss one or more codes to reach agreement on the overall
coding of the justification. This was a good level of agreement,
indicating that the coding scheme was usable, reliable and
valid.
Number of Categories used in Justifications
As children age and language and cognition develop, it is
conceivable that they are able to provide more complex, multi-
faceted justifications for their ratings of artworks. To see
whether, as predicted by hypothesis 3, this was the case in
our data, we calculated the mean number of justifications
provided per child, and subjected this to a Kruskal-Wallis
test with age group as the independent variable. This showed
that the number of categories rose as a function of age,
with 4-year-olds providing 1.2 categories on average, 6-year-
olds 1.4, and both 8-year-olds and 10-year-olds 2.0. This
increase was significant, X2(3) = 42.895, p < 0.001. To examine
where the increase differed significantly between adjacent
age groups, follow-up Mann-Whitney tests were run, and
these showed that the increment between ages 6 and 8 was
the only significant contrast, Z = −4.224, p < 0.001. This
suggests a possible step-change in the complexity of the
justifications between ages 6 and 8. This supports hypothesis 3,
and indicates the ages across which the complexity increases
most.
Frequency of Coding Categories
As observed, children used a higher number of codes in older
age groups. To further examine how the different categories were
used by the children across the two types of artwork as a function
of age, the mean frequency of usage of the 14 coding categories
was calculated as a percentage of the total of the number of
opportunities for each child and art type. The resulting means
can be seen in Table 4, with visualization of the most common
codes in Figure 2.
The most frequent codes, which were used at a frequency
of 10% or greater collapsing over age groups and art type,
were formal artistic properties, color, subject matter, and
understanding/interpretation. The other codes were used more
sparingly by the children, though associations reached 9%
overall.
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TABLE 4 | Frequency of occurrence (in percentages of the total number of opportunities) of the 14 coding categories; separated for abstract and
representational art, with A = Abstract, R = Representational, and 4, 6, 8 and 10 referring to age groups.
A4 R4 A6 R6 A8 R8 A10 R10 Overall
Formal artistic properties 25 3.5 36 24.5 63 43 65.5 47.5 38.5
Color 42 11 49 13.5 58 17 57.5 21.5 33.7
Artist 0 0 2.5 1.5 12 9.5 13 11 6.2
Subject matter 17 73.5 17 67.5 24 68.5 12 66.5 43.3
Associations 7 11.5 6.5 9.5 5 19.5 2 11 9
Understanding/Interpretation 1.5 4 6.5 7.5 17.5 17.5 23.5 16 11.8
Mood emotion 1.5 4.5 2 4 1 5 0.5 13 4
Interest 0 0.5 2.5 4 4.5 5.5 10.5 7.5 4.4
Function 0 0 0 0 0 0 1.5 0 0.2
Comparison 0 0 0 0 8 3 4 6 2.7
History culture 0 2 0 4.5 0 4 0 2 1.6
Perceptual fluency 0 0 0 0 0 0 4 2.5 0.8
Basic liking 13.5 11.5 4 5 2 1 0 0.5 4.7
Other 7 4.5 2 3 1 1.5 0.5 0 2.5
Overall mean frequencies collapsing over age groups and art type are in the final column.
Overall Age Effects on Frequency of Usage of Coding
Categories
Using Kruskal-Wallis tests with the frequency of usage of a
coding category per child as the dependent variable and age
group as the independent variable, it was found that there were
significant effects of age on the use of some codes, namely, formal
artistic properties, X2(3) = 38.3, p < 0.001, with an increasing use
with age, which was significant on a Mann-Whitney comparison
between ages 4 and 6 (Z = −3.304, p = 0.001, and ages 6 and
8, Z = −2.936, p = 0.003) but not ages 8 and 10. Further,
reference to the artist, X2(3) = 25.7, p < 0.001, also increased, with
two significant increments between ages 4 and 6, Z = −2.080,
p = 0.038, and 6 and 8, Z = −2.687, p = 0.017, but not 8 and 10.
FIGURE 2 | Frequency of occurrence (in percentages of the total
number of opportunities) of the five most prominent coding
categories; separated for abstract and representational art, with 4, 6, 8
and 10 referring to age groups.
Understanding and interpretation, X2(3) = 26.3, p < 0.001, also
increased with age, with the age 6 to age 8 increment being the
only significant one, Z = −2.769, p = 0.006. Comparison also
showed an age effect, X2(3) = 26.2, p < 0.001, with a sharp increase
between ages 6 and 8, again the only significant increment in
usage, Z = −3.789, p < 0.001. Perceptual fluency, X2(3) = 15.78,
p = 0.001, showed no usage at all for ages 4–8, with a sudden
onset of usage at age 10, which was significant, Z = −2.354,
p = 0.019.
Some categories showed downward trends. Usage of basic
liking dropped significantly across the age groups, X2(3) = 13.35,
p = 0.004, with the most pronounced drop occurring between
ages 4 and 6, though this contrast did not quite reach significance
on a pairwise Mann-Whitney comparison. ‘‘Other’’ showed a
similar numerical trend, but this was not significant. As these
categories were used by the coders when no other labels applied,
this is likely to be due to the use of other labels.
Justification Category Usage in Abstract vs.
Representational Artwork
The data showed that the use of categories varied by art type.
The mean percentage use for the two art types, collapsing
across the age groups, are shown in Figure 3. A series
of Wilcoxon signed rank tests was run to test whether
the main effect of art type on usage of each category
was significant. In four categories, justifications were used
significantly more frequently as a justification of a rating of
representational than abstract artworks. These were subject
matter, Z = 7.659, p < 0.001; associations, Z = −4.572,
p < 0.001; mood and emotion, Z = 4.462, p < 0.001;
and history and culture, Z = 3.530, p < 0.001. Two
patterns differed in the opposite direction. It was found that
justifications featuring color were significantly more common
in abstract than representational artwork, Z = 7.369, p < 0.001,
as were justifications featuring formal artistic properties,
Z =−4.951, p < 0.001. No other contrasts reached or approached
significance.
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FIGURE 3 | Mean use of the justification categories by art type,
collapsing across age groups, expressed as a percentage of the total
number of opportunities.
Because there is no standard statistical test for non-
parametric data that is equivalent to the factorial interaction
in ANOVA, we tested for interactions by entering all trials
separately (not averaged by subject), and running Chi-Square
tests, with Age Group and Art Type as factors. These showed
only one significant interaction pattern, namely for formal
artistic properties, X2(3) = 18.333, p < 0.001. Further analysis
of this main effect using four Wilcoxon tests (one for each
age group) showed that the difference between abstract and
representational artwork was significant in all age groups,
except at age 10, where the difference in the same direction
narrowly missed significance. In all other categories, the Chi-
Square tests did not reach significance. This confirms the
patterns that can also be seen in the means, that the effect
of art type on category usage was stable across the age
groups.
DISCUSSION
A number of important results were obtained that are central to
furthering the understanding of the development of children’s
aesthetic appreciation. The most noteworthy was a greater
shared liking for representational artworks compared to abstract
artworks at age 8 and 10. This finding was in line with our
primary hypothesis and will be discussed shortly. We also
observed a wider range of aesthetic justifications than previously
identified and a general increase of justifications with age.
Finally, we observed a clear pattern of different justifications
as a function of art type which was stable across the age
groups.
Convergence as a Function of Art Type
and Age
The result central to the aims of this research is the finding
that significantly greater shared liking was present at ages 8 and
10 for representational art compared to abstract art, supporting
our first and primary hypothesis. This finding was predicted
from Vessel and Rubin’s theory and as noted previously, can be
explained in terms of older children having developed similar
thoughts in response to the artwork’s subject matter and which
influenced their liking in systematic and predictable ways.We are
not aware of an alternative theory of aesthetics that would have
predicted, or could explain, this finding. The lack of convergence
in preference for representational artworks in younger children
is in agreement with the view that it takes time to develop
preferences and associations in relation to the depicted subject
matter.
However, there are alternative possible explanations for the
lack of or lower level of convergence with abstract art that we
must consider. At a young age, evaluations of art may not yet
be stable, in that children might not give the same responses
from test to re-test (Pugach et al., 2014). Pugach et al. (2014)
found that younger children (3–6 years) show less stability in
aesthetic judgment than older children (7–9 years), meaning
that individual ratings may be more ‘‘random’’ in a younger
child compared to an older child. Another possibility is that
young children simply do not know how to use rating scales. An
inspection of the data suggests that it is possible that at age 4 such
an explanation may hold, because convergence was very low for
both art types at that age. However, convergence increases for
both abstract and representational art between ages 4 and 6, and
then continues to rise for only representational art between ages
6 and 8, with a further non-significant trend between ages 8 and
10. This difference in the rise in convergence as a function of
art type is not compatible with an explanation in which there
is a general inability to provide stable judgments or to use a
rating scale, as under such an explanation, convergence should
not increase for either type of artwork. Thus, the difference in
convergence between abstract and representational art at ages 8
and 10 seems more likely to be evidence of a shared liking via
meanings and associations for representational artworks only, in
line with Vessel and Rubin (2010) and Schepman et al. (2015b)
than for a generalized instability in using the ratings, particularly
from age 6 upwards.
A potentially profound implication of this finding is that
similar patterns of shared liking can be expected for the
development of children’s preferences toward other items, such
as toys, consumer items and foods. These preferences may
show a different developmental trajectory, depending on the
nature of the item, consistency of exposure and strength of
emotional response, but, based on these results we predict
that the development of convergence in liking is a general
(and measurable) phenomenon. In addition, if Vessel and
Rubin’s (2010) theory is correct then it might account for the
development of shared liking in a wide range of circumstances.
For instance, if repeated exposure to items in the world elicits
similar experiences in people, which comprise similar thoughts
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and emotions, then this may be an important way in which
children develop shared meanings and values about the world.
A potential mechanism by which associations between entities
in the real world and affective interpretations of those entities
are formed could include statistical learning (Saffran et al., 1996;
Kushnir et al., 2010). We will return to other predictions from
this theory when we consider the verbal justifications, shortly.
Art Type Preference
We note that in our second hypothesis we expected ratings for
representational art to be higher than those for abstract art in the
older age group, but we did not obtain strong statistical evidence
for this. It is possible that this analysis suffered from a lack of
statistical power. Compared to the adult data reported in Table 1
and in Schepman et al. (2015b) we used a narrower rating scale
(1–5 stars for the children, 1–7 points for the adults). This was
based on our prior evaluation that children would be more able
to cope with a five-star rating system than one which had seven
points, in part because children may have used such star ratings
in their daily lives (e.g., on reviews for books or games etc.). The
narrower scale may have reduced measurement sensitivity and
statistical power in this part of the data set. We exercise caution
in evaluating hypothesis 2 due to this issue, which makes it
difficult to distinguish between a genuine null effect and a type II
error.
Verbal Justifications
The three most common categories used to justify ratings
were formal artistic properties, color, and subject matter,
which are the same as those identified by Lin and Thomas
(2002; note that their term for our formal artistic properties
is ‘‘medium’’). Additional justifications also influenced the
children’s preferences, which were not detected to a significant
extent by Lin and Thomas (2002), and included understanding
and interpretation, associations, and references to the artist (11.8,
9 and 6.2% of usage frequency, respectively). Therefore our
methodology appears to have been able to identify the most
important categories whilst also being sensitive at detecting
nuances in the multi-faceted nature of aesthetic justifications
that have not been observed before. To a substantial degree
the properties of the artwork determined the justifications the
children gave for liking an artwork, so that there were systematic
and predictable differences between the types of art (see also Lin
and Thomas, 2002). There were also clear effects of age. The
remainder of the findings will be discussed in two subsections,
namely the effect of art type on frequency of use of the
justification categories, and the effect of age on the number and
type of justification categories used.
Usage of the Categories as a Function
of Art Type
Representational artworks appear to be liked because of what
they depict. Subject matter, associations, mood and emotion, and
history and culture were usedmore frequently as justifications for
evaluations of representational than abstract artworks. Although
associations were provided as justifications significantly more
for representational than for abstract artworks, they were not
common, occurring with an overall frequency of 12.9% for
representational art. This is a much higher frequency than
obtained by Lin and Thomas (2002), perhaps because our
definition was slightly broader than theirs, but it is lower than
would be expected if associations have an important influence on
liking and shared preferences.
The apparently limited incidence of associative thoughts is
likely to be a product of how we defined the category of
associations to capture memories and personal experiences,
whilst being distinct from the category of subject matter,
which required its own category to ensure coding reliability.
As explained in the results section this was needed to implement
a reliable coding scheme that made a distinction between aspects
of associative thoughts and subject matter. The data show
that for representational art subject matter is overwhelmingly
the most frequent justification mentioned (69%), showing that
thoughts in response to the subject matter determined liking
more than any other aspect of the representational artwork.
It is probable, therefore, that some justifications that were based
on semantic interpretations of the artwork’s content will have
been categorized as subject matter rather than associations.
For example, in response to artwork 5 (5: Mark Peterson: ‘55
T-Bird), which depicts a car on a beach, a child gave the
artwork one star ‘‘Cos there’s a car on it’’. This does not
explicitly reveal memories or personal experiences and was
therefore not coded as showing associations, but nevertheless
indicates that the subject matter was interpreted negatively
and this drove the rating. Similarly, for artwork 6 (Jay Kemp:
Return to Sender), which depicts a dog swimming with a
stick in its mouth, one child gave the justification ‘‘I like
it cos the dog’s fetching the thing’’, clearly illustrating an
interpretation beyond simply naming the most salient object.
Instead, the responses reveal more complex interpretative
processes, with different viewers selecting different aspects of
the subject matter in their justifications. Such interpretations
were also observed by Schepman et al. (2015a) with adult
participants. While these examples were not coded as an
association under our definition, they are in agreement with
the idea that interpretive thoughts elicited by the subject
matter determine liking (e.g., Leder et al., 2004; Vessel and
Rubin, 2010; Schepman et al., 2015b). Therefore, while the
infrequent use of associations as a justification category appears
to cast doubt on the suggested role of associative thoughts
in liking, we believe this is an unavoidable consequence of
the need for our coding scheme to be reliable. This very
interesting issue could be further explored in future studies by
the use of a more quantitative analysis of semantic associations,
for example using the method devised by Schepman et al.
(2015a).
Abstract artworks appear to be liked for their colors
and formal artistic properties, as these were more frequently
used as justifications for abstract than representational work.
It is apparent, therefore, that even young children were
sensitive to the visual properties of the art and that these
seemed to play more of a role in the evaluation of abstract
than representational art, perhaps because, in the absence of
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discernible subject matter, color and formal properties such
as line and composition are more salient (Jolley and Thomas,
1994). This result echoes observations by Gardner et al. (1975),
who noted that 4- and 5-year-olds liked abstract art because of
the ‘‘pretty colors’’ and ‘‘nice design’’. Interestingly, we found
some evidence of children attempting to impose meanings
or associations on abstract art, which was also observed by
Gardner et al. (1975). Such ‘‘romancing’’ can also be seen in
the early stages of children’s own drawing productions where
representational intentions may frequently change (Golomb,
1982, 1992).
As evidenced in Schepman et al. (2015a), in adult viewers
there appears to be some shared meaning in response to abstract
works (see also Vessel and Rubin, 2010). The responses made
by the children in the current study also showed some overlap
alongside the hypothesized idiosyncrasy in interpretation.
For example, in response to artwork 15 (Stephanie Kordan
Dardashti: Desire Red) one child’s justification was ‘‘I like
the leaves’’, and a further child offered ‘‘. . . the leaves are
covering the middle . . .’’, another ‘‘. . . it’s like fire’’, and
another ‘‘. . . like an Indian campfire . . .’’, while another
stated ‘‘. . . like a city’’. This overlap in meaning (leaves,
fire), with some idiosyncrasy (city) and a larger number
of responses not related to subject matter at all illustrates
the pattern found more widely in the current data. The
question to what extent any semantic interpretations of abstract
art are shared across children seems an interesting line to
investigate in more detail in future research, because it may
provide an insight into children’s interpretation of visual
language.
Effects of Age on Justification Categories
As predicted in hypothesis 3, an age-related increase in the
variety and complexity of justifications was found (on average
1.2 categories were used at 4 years, 1.4 at 6 years, and 2
categories at 8 and 10 years), which a significant increase
from ages 6–8. Moreover, there was no loss of justifications
across the ages, but a general expansion of the categories, with
an increased role for cognitive processes (see also Schabmann
et al., 2015). The notable increase in the complexity of
justifications from 6–8 suggests a rapid development in the
number of factors that influence aesthetic appreciation across
this age boundary. A developmental explanation is offered by
Machotka (1966), who reported similar results and suggested
that this is analogous to the transition between pre-operational
and concrete operational thought in Piaget’s (1947) theory
of intellectual development. Undoubtedly part of the increase
in the complexity of the justifications with age is due to
neurocognitive development, with basic sensori-motor areas of
the brain maturing earlier than higher-order association areas
that support more integrative functions (see Weisner, 1996;
Gogtay et al., 2004; Jambon and Smetana, 2014; for a review
see Del Giudice, 2014). Brain maturation also underpins the
further development of cognitive processes such as working
memory (Bunge and Wright, 2007), metacognition, and Theory
of Mind, which may be necessary for children to be able
to provide some justifications. Finally we must note that a
general increase of language ability may also play a role in the
increase of the number of categories with age, particularly when
examining changes from ages 4–6, where we saw a significant
drop in basic liking in favor of more specific justifications that
may be harder for children with limited language abilities to
articulate.
One key category that increased significantly in frequency
from ages 6–8 was understanding and interpretation. Schabmann
et al. (2015) also showed a greater drive towards understanding
and interpretation in their older age group, and our results
corroborate the view that understanding plays an important role
in aesthetic appreciation (Leder et al., 2004) but also suggest that
this drive for meaning follows a particular time-course which
may depend on levels of neurocognitive development, as well as
possible influences of experience.
We found significant increases in the recognition of the role
of the artist as an agent, namely between ages 4 and 6, and again
between ages 6 and 8. In previous research, the ability to consider
the role and intentions of the artist has been found to occur
in 5- and 7-year-olds and coincides with the development of
Theory of Mind (Callaghan and Rochat, 2003). It is notable that
reference to the artist increased significantly twice, suggesting
that, unlike formal TOM tests which categorize pass (as opposed
to fail) on false belief at around age 4 (Baron-Cohen et al.,
1985), the spontaneous use of interpretations that testify to a
Theory of Mind continue to increase beyond that stage (see also
Keysar et al., 2003; Lagattuta et al., 2015). It is also around the
age of 7 that children develop an interpretive Theory of Mind
(i-TOM) which is the understanding that the same picture can be
perceived differently by people (Carpendale and Chandler, 1996)
and this may also have been reflected in the children’s increased
focus on the intentions of the artist. Such interpretations are in
line the view that there is a general widening of perspective-
taking ability and reduction in egocentrism (Parsons et al., 1978).
As judgment decenters and becomes less egocentric, children can
develop a broader, more abstract cognitive style that is associated
with expert aesthetic taste (Child, 1965).
It is interesting to note that children at age 10 started using
the justification of perceptual fluency, i.e., the experience of
the effort of perceiving the artwork (see Reber et al., 1998).
This points to a high degree of introspection and metacognitive
awareness, as these abilities are necessary for the children to
be able to relate their ease of processing the artwork to their
level of appreciation. This makes its recognition as a reason for
liking artworks by relatively young children quite remarkable.
We must add that it was rare for children to articulate this, but
it is nevertheless noteworthy that they did at all. It is possible that
this is connected to a concept worthy of further research, namely
that of conceptual fluency (Alter andOppenheimer, 2009), which
refers to the ease with which meaning can be gleaned from
an entity (in our case, an artwork). Paradoxically, it has been
observed that adult viewers who have more experience with
artwork may value a lack of conceptual fluency (Belke et al.,
2015). It would be interesting to study at which time this may
onset at slightly later stages of development, as it is conceivable
that this may begin during adolescence.
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In our study children did not give emotion as a frequent
justification (on average 4% overall), and when they did it
was significantly more for representational than abstract art,
perhaps due to the higher inclusion of facial expressions
where emotion is portrayed literally, and thus is more easily
understood (Ives, 1984; Jolley et al., 2004). While this significant
difference is predicted by association theory, the low level
of usage runs counter to the central role that emotions are
believed to have in the aesthetic experience (Cupchik and
Laszlo, 1992; Leder et al., 2004; Belke et al., 2010; Else et al.,
2015). Moreover, Schabmann et al. (2015) found emotion was
important in aesthetic evaluations at all ages but more so for
younger children, with older children’s evaluation becoming
increasingly cognitively based and knowledge-driven. A probable
reason for this apparent discrepancy is that, in our study,
any reference to emotion was spontaneous, and just because
children did not mention emotion in their justifications, does
not necessarily mean that emotions did not play a role in
their evaluations. As demonstrated by Schepman et al. (2015b),
a participant’s thoughts in response to an artwork may not
explicitly show any emotional content, but they do have clear
and strong emotional relevance to those individuals when
they are asked to rate the valence of those thoughts (see
also Augustin et al., 2012). In Schabmann’s work the rating
of emotion was specifically elicited by a rating scale, while
in our study it was only recorded if children mentioned it
spontaneously during their justification. We suggest, therefore,
that emotions could easily have played a role in our study
but children may be less likely to report the role of emotions
spontaneously, perhaps because of lower levels of metacognition,
difficulties in articulating emotional influences (see e.g., Mayer
et al., 1990; Harris, 2008) or because other more salient
influences, such as subject matter, came to mind first. For
example, children as young as five can be sensitive to emotions
expressed in art if they are provided with a set of verbal
labels from which to make their decision (e.g., Carothers and
Gardner, 1979; Blank et al., 1984) and while children may
not spontaneously refer to emotions when matching pictures
on the basis of mood until age 11, they can do this at age
five when explicitly instructed to do so (Jolley and Thomas,
1995).
To summarize, it is clear from the data that different
justifications follow a different developmental time-course, with
attributes such as color and subject matter being present at
all ages but with understanding and interpretation, perceptual
fluency, and reference to the artist gaining in importance with
increasing age. This might suggest that certain basic attributes
such as color and subject matter are key to aesthetic appreciation
and of primary importance at all ages, possibly because they
rely less on a particular level of cognitive development. This
developmental profile of the children’s justifications, showing
a focus on basic perceptual analysis at early ages and an
increased role of cognition and understanding at older ages,
corresponds to the organization of Leder et al.’s (2004)
stage model of aesthetic experience. Perhaps the stages of
aesthetic experience described by Leder et al. (2004), have, to
an extent, been determined by the stages of neurocognitive
development in children. Young children are strongly driven
by the visual properties of the artwork, features which remain
important at older ages, but with increased age and cognitive
development other cognitive processes come into play, which
drive the need to understand the artwork. The combination
of complete cognitive development, and extensive experience
and knowledge of art, enables individuals to process an
artwork in different ways, attending to its structural properties,
meaning, and style, to reach a richer aesthetic experience
(Winston and Cupchik, 1992; Leder et al., 2004; Cupchik et al.,
2009).
Future Neuroscientific Studies
While it has been suggested that understanding the neural
mechanisms of aesthetic processing in children may be
challenging (see e.g., Nieminen et al., 2011, section 7), our
work documenting reasons given for the liking of artwork
suggests potential fruitful lines of investigation for future neuro-
aesthetic studies. It would seem particularly useful to examine
whether, in the viewing of abstract artworks, color-processing
areas of the visual cortex are differently engaged than in the
viewing of representational artwork (see e.g., Zeki and Marini,
1998). A further fruitful line would be to examine the role of
semantic processing in the viewing of artworks, as it would
seem that greater activation of visual semantic areas (e.g.,
left occipito-temporal areas) should be expected during the
viewing of representational artworks (Rossion et al., 2000),
while activation in these areas may also indicate attempts
to attribute meanings to abstract art, as demonstrated by
the children in our study and in adults by Schepman et al.
(2015a).
CONCLUSION
The results support the view that shared liking for artworks
starts to emerge around 8 years of age, for representational
art only. This is compatible with observations from non-expert
adult observers (Vessel and Rubin, 2010; Schepman et al.,
2015b), who also show significantly greater convergence in
liking for representational than abstract artwork. This is the
first time that this has been shown in children. The finding
is compatible with an interpretation that shared meanings,
associations, and their associated attributions of positive and
negative valence emerge at this time. An important implication
from our work is that the processes underlying the convergence
in aesthetic appreciation may have a wider role in driving
shared liking to other items in the world. Our results also
show that children are able to provide justifications for their
evaluations from a very young age, but are able to do this in more
complex and sophisticated ways as they get older. As with non-
expert adults, subject matter seems to dominate justifications
for representational artwork, while color and formal artistic
properties dominate those for abstract art. Overlaying these
dominant categories, the art interpretations gain in richness as
children get older, showing evidence of newly acquired cognitive
and meta-cognitive abilities, such as Theory of Mind, that are
likely to be a product of general neurocognitive development,
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with likely further influences from education and cultural
exposure. The results provide a rich overview of the influences
on aesthetic preference in children throughout the primary
school age.
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